Introduction
The origin of the eye, once considered one of the hardest problems for evolutionary science, now looks almost trivial compared with the problem of the origin of human language. What makes tlie question of eye origin now seem to be so easy? There are at least four reasons. First, the anatomy and physiology of the eye are relatively well understood. Second, there are many eye forms that can serve as plausible evolutionarily intermediate Stages (even the vertebrate eye has a close analogue in cephalopods). Third, altliough apparently related to an ancestral light-sensitive spot, eyes with various anatomical and physiological structures evolved about forty times. Fourth, the genetics of eye development is now better understood.
Compare these with the corresponding list for language origin. First, our knowledge of the "language organ" is fairly liinited. Second there seems to be no extant intermediate between "protolanguage" (broadly understood as liinited vocabulary without syntax) and human language. Third, even the much simpler protolanguage evolved only a few times (candidate species where protolanguage could be used in the wild include bottle-nosed dolphins, grey parrots, and chimps), and natural language evolved only once. Fourth, the genetics of human language is largely unknown.
It may seem, then, almost impossible to say anything useful about the origin of natural language. Nevertheless, there are at least five sources of scientific input that can, I think, contribute to enhancing our understanding of this conundrum:
The spread of elements of vocabulary and language rules can be analysed using the tools of population biology (Nowak and Krakauer 1999, Nowak et al. 2000) . A better understanding of primate communication and social life greatly contributes to narrowing the evolutionary and intellectual gap between our ancestors and us. The anatomy, physiology, and genetics of specific language impairment (SLIlf expand-OUF knowledge of language's biological foundations,-Neu: nonin\~nsive brain analysis niethods (such as PET) reveal a surprisingly dynamic neural foundation for Iiuman language. We are in the process of forinulating a selectionist picture, connected to brain epigenesis. of wliat happens iiiside tlie brain during at least some forms of learning.
In this essay I urill elaborate on the last four points. I will argue that our increased iinderstandiiig in tliese areas points toward a "language amoeba" in tlie human brain. Tlie language amoeba is the neural activity pattern that essentially coiitributes to processing of linguistic inforniation, especially syntax. It is a sort of dynamic maiiifestation of Cliomsky's language Organ. It finds its "habitat" in the developing human brain, wliereas the brains of other primates apparently cannot sustain it. Why? 1 attempt to outline a tentative ansurer. Since the gap between other primates and us is fairly narrow, the genetic and correlated f~iiictional changes could not have been too numerous. Wliat were tlie critical changes? 1 argue that an appropriate and rather widespread cnnnectivity pattern in tlie immature human brain renders it a liabitat for the emerging language amoeba. This change does not require too many altered (probably regulatory) genes, biit there are great risks involved wliich make this "inajor transition" truly difficult.
Primate cornmlinication and cognition: the narrowing gap
Primates are especially relevant, since they are our closest evolutionary relatives. Bickerton (1 992) correctly einphasises that the riglit starting point for understandiiig the origin of natural language is something lilze protolanguage. Our closest relatives seem to possess it in some form. They transmit signals that inny well turn out to be Saussurean signs: tliere is an orderly and reversible relation in the brain that links object to concept to sign. Sensitivity to conspecific vocalisations, but not to other types of auditory iiipiit, seems to be lateralised (Gliazanfar and Hauser 1999) . Apes can be taucht soine elements of human language, but their syntactic abilities are clearly limited. This is even true for "action gramniar": the hierarcliical structure of einbedded actions. Chimps seein to be severely limited with recursive embedding (a crucial eleinent of natural syntax): they usually cannot go beyoiid three levels. Reiuarkably, "linguistically" trained chimps d o somewhat better (Greenfield 1991) . The case of Kanzi demonstrates thar childhöiid lenrning is Bettm thaii äddatt tearningand-rhxunamnnding is easier than production. But this sliould not surprise a human too inuch. In the social context. apes seein to carry all the necessary Machiavellian weapons that we do.
In an insightful paper, Worden (1995) deduced a "speed limit" for evolution that seems surprisingly uniform despite the fact that the relative contributions of component processes (mutation, recoinbination, selection, and drift) are allowed to vary. He argues that the number of genes specifically associated with the "language organ" must be rather limited, which prompts one to think that it was not the nuinber of genes, but their identity (i.e., inainly regulatory effects) that was peculiar during the evoliition of natural language.
All this leads me to two conclusions. First, apes can do everything that we can do -expect for things that require language or neural processing abilities that are likely to have evolved through natural selection for language. Second, there are likely to be surprisingly few genes associated with laiiguage's neural substrate that are critically different from ape geneslalleles.
Specific language impairment (SLT): phenomenon and genetics
There is no disagreement that SLI is real. What is contested is how closely it is limited to, or rooted in, a specific grammatical impairinent. The famous Gopnilc (1 999) case has been very stiinulating because of its characterisation as "feature-blind" dysphasia and its obvioiis genetic background (a single dominant allele). Whetl-ier other cognitive skills are also, or even primarily, affected has been debated ever since (Vargha-Kadem et al. 1998) . Recently, more evidence involving other linguistic groups has accumulated (Dalalakis 1999 , Rose and Royle 1999 , Tomblin and Pandich 1999 . A recent paper (Van der Lely et al. 1998) , sadly without genetics, claims to deinonstrate that grainmatically limited SLI exists in "children", notwithstandiilg the fact that it only studies one child.
Clearly, more genetics is needed. But the task is formidable owing to the obvious restrictions. I expect some crucial input to coine from the genome projects. This input includes a list of genes and alleles that act as liability genes (Flint 1999) for language and that can cause SLI when mutated. Moreover, extension to a primate genoine project could reveal geiles and alleles that are closely and specifically associated with human language.
It is worth reinembering that the genetics of human cognitive tasks is a mtmkmlydifficrrit ~o b 1 e m -T t r e c~h r r i m l c g~~i s ; " i t i m m l lyrrot sufficient ris descriptions of plienotypes (Flint 1999) . Nevertlieless, a con5ensus seenis to be emergirig tliat tlie genes involved are so-called "liability geiles" that. w1iei.i present in the right allelic form, significantly enhance the probability of developing the respective cognitive skills. We can safely conclude the following:
Specific language impairment does exist, and some of its forrns seein to be familial. There is disagreement as to wliether it is restricted to graminar. The likely explanation behind these contrasting views is that the genetic factors in question distort smaller or larger parts of the brain. Wlien language becomes localised, the morpho-pliysiological distortions involved partially overlap with the habitat ofthe langiiage amoeba. It is easy to see that tlie relative size of tlie overlap with the outlying regions and the nature of the affected regions of the habitat will influence tl-ie degree to which the impairment is specific to language or, more specifically, to grammar (see Figure 1 ). Since inany of tlie genes are likely to influence the epigenesis of a certain brain area, incornplete penetration can cause more or less severe forms of impairment.
iinpaired rcgions
Neural dvnamics and localisation of language: noninvasive studies
The analysis of neural activity during the performance of cognitive tasks has becoine a growth industry. The equipment's sensitivity hns increased over the years. These methods are increasingly used to record brain activity duriiig lineuistic performance.
It is now widely accepted that neural localisation of langiiage cail be plastic (Nobre and Plunkett 1997 , Neville and Bavalier 1998 , Musso et al. 1999 . Studies of brain injury have revealed that damage to the left hernisphere before a critical period is not necessarily debilitating because the right hemispliere can take over the necessary f~inctions (Miiller et al. 1999 ). This does not contradict the fiilding that in most people Broca's area does seem specialised for Syntax (Embick et al. 2000) . It thus seems that the common left-hemisphere localisation of language is just the most likely outcome when there is no genetic or epigenetic disturbance. PET studies have revealed a truly shocking feature of language developinent: the localisation of linguistic processing sliifts during normal ontogenesis. The outcome in "normal" people is also highly variable.
Analysis of a particiilarly interesting genetic syndrome called Williams syndrome also re\feals surprisingly dyi~ainic manifestations during ontogeilesis. Whereas affected children seem to be bad at language and good with numbers, adults perform the other way round (Paterson et al. 1999 ). Needless to say, the classic characterisation of the disease has been based on adult performance.
I draw the following conclusions from brain studies. First, language localisation is not fiilly genetically determined: even major injuries can be tolerated before a critical period. Second, language localisation to certain brain areas is a liighly plastic process, both in its developinent and its end result. Third a surprisingly large part of the brain can sustain language. True. there are recognised areas that seeni to be inost conimonly associated with language, but these are by no means euclusive, either at the individual or the population level, or during either normal or impaired ontogenesis. Fourth, whereas a large Part of the human brain can sustain langiiage, no suc1.i region exists in apes.
Brain epigenesis: plasticity and selection
It's time for a confession: on the whole, we don't understand how the brain works. Nevertheless, some crucial elements seem to be apparent. One is that the normal brain's development is enormously plastic, even though the power of genetic factors is obvious. One classic exainple is that in the same brain area of identical twins the two hemispheres of the same individual reseinble eacli other more closely t l~a n the twin's corresponding hemispheres (Changeux 1953) .
Another insight is that a tremendous amount of variation and selection is going on during brain ontogenesis. This is doubtless a Darwinian process. Ac the psychologist William Jaines recognised a long time ago, natural selection of heritable variation js the only known force that can lead to adaptations, which has led to its application to both brain ontogenesis and problem-solving. There are several studies that all regard the brain, in one way or another, as a "Darwin machine" (see Calvin and Bickerton 2000). I think Changeiix's formulation ( I 983) is the most relevant to the language probleiii. According to this view, the functional micro-anatomy of tlie adult Cortex results from the vast initial surplus stock of synapses a i~d their selective eliinination according to functional criteria (see Figure 2 ).
The previous section indicated that a large part of the human brairi can process linguistic inforination and perform syntactical operations. This means that there is no fixed macro-anatomical structure that is exclusively I dedicated to language, but that the micro-anatomical structure must be appropriate, otherwise it could not sustain language. There is consequently I some statistical connectivity feature of a large Part of the human brain that I suits it to linguistic processing. From the selectionist perspective (see Figure  2) there are three options: the initial variation in synaptic connectivity is novel; the means of selecting functional criteria are novel; or both. I think it is likely that both component processes are different in the relevant human brain areas. 1 would not dare to speculate on their relative importance.
Tt is necessary to See this idea in close connection with Rapoport's observations (1999) on the bottom-up coevolution of brain and cognition.
According to the bottom-up view, a genetic change of some neural striictiire is subjected to selection, and based 011 its performance it either spreads or i does not. There is, however, a so-called top-down mechanism that could have contributed more significantly to the evolution of human cognitive skills, including -especially, I argue -language (See Figure 3) . The top-! down view has three crucial cotnponents. First, due to the plasticity of brain I development, enhanced demands on a certain brain region lead to less synaptic pruning (a known mechanism). Second, less synaptic pruning leads to more elaborate (and more adaptive) performance. Tliird, natural selection will favour any genetic change contributing to the growth of that brain area. Two additional observatioiis are necessary. First (as Rapoport himself conceded), tlie top-down mechanisin is a more detailed exposition of the late Alan Wilson's theory. According to Wilson, a larger brain. due to its more cornplex perfomiance, alters the selective environment (in social animals it is coinposed largely of conspecifics), which selects for an even larger brain, aiid SO on. Second, aiid perhaps more importantly, this mechanisin is also a neat exarnple of a Baldwin effect (or genetic assimilation), in which learning guides evolution. As Terry Deacon (1 997) points out, applying the notion of genetic assimilation to language is trickier tliaii is usually thought. The reason for this is that the performed behaviour must be sufficiently long lasting and uniform in the population. It is thus hard to imagine how, say, specific grammatical rules could hnve been genetically assimilated. Here, however, we are dealing with a different phenomenon: the genetic assimilation of a general processin mechanisin that is performed via tlie connectivity of the U underlying neural structures. My claim is that the network's ability to process syntactical inforination was the most important -and largely novelfaculty selected for. The specific Iiypotliesis is that linguistically competent areas of the human brain have a statistical connectivity pattern that renders them especially suitable for syntactical operations. This leads ine to three conclusions. First, the origin of human language required genetic changes in the mechanisin of epigenesis in large parts of the brain. Second, this change affected statistical connectivity Patterns of the neural networks involved. Third, due to the selectionist plasticity of brain epigenesis, coevolution of language and tlie brain resulted in the genetic assimilation of syntactical processing ability as such. But if this is true, then why isn't language more comrnon?
The origin of language: a difficult transition?
Some ri-ia.ior traiisitions in evolution (such as the origin of multicellular organisms or that of social animals) occurred a nuniber of times, whereas others (tlie origin of the genetic code or of Ianguage) seem to have beeri unique events. One inust be cautious with the word "unique", however. Because we lack tlie "true" phylogeny of all extinct and extant organisins, we can give it only an operational definition. Tf all the extant and fossil species that possess traits diie to a particular transition share a last common ancestor after that transition, then the transition is said to be unique. It is obviously possible that tfiere Iiave been independent "trials", but we do not have comparative or fossil evidence for tliem. Two factors can lead to "truly"~unique transition.
1) The transition is variation-limited. This means that the set of requisite genetic alterations lias a very low probability. "Constraints" operate here in a broad sense. 2) The transition is selection-limited. This means that there is something special in the selective environment that favours the fixation of variants that are otherwise not particularly rare. Both abiotic and biotic factors can contribute to this limitation.
There are interesting sub-cases for botli types of limitation. For I), one can always enquire about the time-scale. "Not enough time" means tliat given a short evolutionary time horizon the requisite variations have a very low probability, though tliis could change with a widened horizon. An interesting sub-case of 2) is "pre-emption", ineaning that the traits resulting from the transitions carry out selective overkill and sweep through the biota so quickly that further evolutionary trials are competitively suppressed. The genetic code could be a case in point.
It is hard to assess at tlie moment wliy language is unique. Even the notenough-time case could apply, whicli would be amusing. But pre-emption, due to the subsequent cultural evolution that language has triggered, inay render further trials very difficult. There is, however, another indication that language could be variation-limited in a deeper sense.
The habitat of the language amoeba is a large, appropriately connected neural network. Most of the information processing within the network elaborates on information coming from other parts of the network. There is a special type of processing required, namely that of hierarchically embedded syntactic structures. I See the following difficulties:
Neural networks contain a large number of cycles. Syntactic structures of language are tree-like. It seems difficult to process large trees without getting iiito loops. Overproduction of initial synapses or decreased pruning. botli implied in the origin of language, may easily lead to "solipsist" network dynamics. This has two consequences. First, the network's activity is detached more than optiinally from external sources of information. Second, exaggerated internal processing leads to too much "internal talking": linguistic processing for its o~vn sake.
I think schizophrenia is a case in point. It may be, as some Iiave contended, the "price for language" (Crow 2000 , Maddox 1997 . True, this syndrome affects a surprisingly large portion -up to 5 percent -of the human population. But this is exactly tlie type of pattern one would expect from an evolutionarily recent major transition. Insufiicient adaptive fine-tuning causes the device to malfunction fairly frequently. Brain lateralisation is partly a means to decrease the spontaneous fission of the language amoeba, which could othenvise happen more easily. After all, a large habitat caii sustain two amoebas. Moreover, there is evidence thnt schizophrenic people display reduced lateralisation (Gold and Weinberger 1995 , Shapleske et al. 1999 , Zaidel 1999 , Niznikiewicz et al. 2000 .
The idea that a schizophrenic language amoeba is split into two (or more) functional offspring can be tested by, for example, PET and related methods. In practice, however, tliis might be liampered by tlie fact that the two entities' spatial separation may not be apparent enougli to be observable.
Modelling
One of tlie ways to lest my ideas would be to model neural network architectures that are particularly suited to syntactic processing. Obviously, it cannot be a clumsy application of sorne current connectionist model (see Elman et al. 1996) . There are tliree reasons that discourage me from applying such models. First, they tend to use some variant of the back-propagation algorithrn, whicli is known to be grossly unrealistic (Crick 1998). Second, they cannot figure out abstract rules in the way people seem to do readily (Marcus 1998 , Marcus et al. 1999 ). Third, they do not incorporate tlie implementation of neuronal selection.
My sugpestion for a more fruitful modelling of linguistic operatioiis by neural network is straightfonvard: impleinent the selectionist picture ( Figure  2 ) ns an algorithm. Tlie plasticity involved could more easily lead to the appropriate architecture.
My recommendation contains an additional twist. It Comes from the recognition that even the rules of epigenetic plasticity are themselves evolutionarily plastic; that is, they can be moulded by variation and selection. This evolutionary plasticity is probably also necessary for a successful research project. Very recently, Rolls and Stringer (2000) presented such a novel rnethod for the design of neuronal networks. They specify a number of geG types influencingthe development of neuronal networks. A small nuinbm Tiie origin qf tize lluninn laiigungefac~~ltj~ 5 1 of genes specify the generic properties (e.g., the number of neurons in the class and the firing threshold) of a certain neuron class. A larger number of genes influences synapse formation from neurons in other classes onto neurons in the given class. Genetically determined traits include whether the connection is excitatory or inhibitory, the nature of the learning rule at the synapse, and the initial synaptic strengths. A genetic algorithm was used to evolve networks performing a particular task, including competitive learning, pattern association. and auto-association. Such an approach would also be welcome in language studies.
Where to start?
It is not obvious where to start evolving a linguistic neuronal network. This problem relates to the question of whether the connectivity pattern in the language amoeba's habitat is unprecedented among primates. Probably not. First, because it is a statistically determined property, a few such areas must appear by chance. Second, my guess is that apes use similar areas for social cognition, but that limited cortical size does not provide a sufficient habitat for the language amoeba. The idea that social cognition (including the mental simulation of actions in a partially hierarchical network) is a good prerequisite for language is not new (Calvin and Bickerton 2000). Deacon's (1 997) observation that an increase in the size of the prefrontal cortex coiild have critically liberated parts of the brain from visceral tasks is another case in point.
